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Testing the Hand that Bites You:
Johnetta J. v. The Municipal Court,
Mandatory AIDS Testing, and the Fourth
Amendment
I.

INTRODUCTION

The specter of AIDS' hangs over this country like the plagues of
ancient Egypt, 2 perplexing its leaders and haunting its citizens; it is
estimated that each year at least forty thousand adults and adolescents,
and fifteen hundred infants are added to the one million people in
3
the United States already infected with the deadly virus, and no cure
4 If progress on prevention and treatment is not made soon,
is in sight.
even more distressing figures have been predicted: "By the year 2,000,
unless astonishing progress is made in the development of a vaccine
to prevent this infection, there will be a cumulative total of five

1. Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome [hereinafter AIDS], is the clinical
description of a condition where the immune system of the victim has ceased to
function effectively, making the victim susceptible to life-threatening infections that
would be harmless to an uninfected individual. See generally CHAMBERLIN & CURRAN,
Epidemiology and Prevention of AIDS and HIV Infection, in PRINCIPLES AND
PRACTICE OF INFECTIOUS DISEASES

1029, 1030 (G. Mandell, R. Douglas & J. Bennett,

3d ed. 1990); Curran & Jaffee, Epidemiology of HIV Infection and AIDS in the
United States, 239 Sci. 610-616 (1988).
2. Exodus 7:13.
3. It was estimated that 52,000 - 57,000 new AIDS cases would be diagnosed
in 1990. Also estimated is that the number of deaths from the virus will total 285,000
- 340,000 at the end of 1993, and that as many as 98,000 new cases will be diagnosed
in that year. HIV Prevalence Estimates and AIDS Case Projectionsfor the United
States: Reports Based Upon a Workshop, Centers for Disease Control, 39 MORBIDITY
AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REP.

1, 12 (November 30, 1990); In 1991, AIDS patients

will require between eight and sixteen billion dollars worth of medical care. 509
INDIVIDUAL EMP. RIGHTS MANUAL (BNA) 201 (1988).
4. ConstitutionalQuestions:Mandatory Testingfor AIDS under Washington's
AIDS Legislation, 424 GONZ. L. REv. 433-5 (1988-89) [hereinafter Questions] (quoting

U.S.

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, UNDERSTANDING

(CDC) HHS-88-8404 (Centers for Disease Control, May, 1988)).

445

AIDS, No.
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million cases of AIDS in America alone. Worldwide there will be
twenty-five million cases." 5
The effect of the mysterious disease on our legal system has been
equally troubling. In response to the fear ignited by this invariably
fatal disease, leaders and governmental bodies around the country are
beginning to address the difficult legal issues implicated by AIDS, its
transmission, and the danger it poses to our country's welfare. Fear
has occasionally escalated to the point that calls went out for universal
testing for the AIDS virus, 6 and quarantine of those who test positive. 7
A somewhat less drastic response to the crises has been to require
testing of persons in certain groups who are either at high risk of
catching or transmitting the virus or function in a heavily regulated
environment. 8 These groups have included blood donors, 9 applicants
for marriage licenses, 10 aliens," members of the military, 12 hospital

5. Schoenstein, Standards of Conduct, Multiple Defendants, and Full Recovery of Damages in Tort Liability for the Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency
Virus, 18 HOFSTRA L. REv. 37, 39 (1989) (quoting W. MASTERS V. JOHNSON, & R.
KOLODNY, CRISIS: HETEROSEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE AGE OF AIDS, 15 (1988)).
6. Though this comment refers continually to testing for the AIDS virus, the
most widely performed tests actually test for antibodies produced by the body to
fight the AIDS virus, not the virus itself. Field, Testing for AIDS: Uses and Abuses,
16 AM. J.L. & MED. 34, 38 (1990) [hereinafter Testing] .
7. Testing, supra note 6, at 34, 45, 54 (1990). In California, seven hundred
thousand voters supported Lyndon LaRouche's Proposition 64 on the November
1986 ballot. The proposition, if enacted into law, would have forced public officials
to quarantine anyone carrying the AIDS virus, and forbidden them to teach in or
attend the public schools or taking jobs involving handling food. The state health
director stated that the proposition could be read as mandating testing of all twentyseven million of California's voters. Comment, The ConstitutionalImplications of
Mandatory Testing for Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome - AIDS, 37 EMORY
L.J. 217, 228-29 (1988) [hereinafter ConstitutionalImplications] (quoting New York
Times, Sept. 11, 1986 at A27, col. 1). Legislation that would have allowed the state
to quarantine AIDS victims was withdrawn by its sponsor in Colorado in May, 1986.
509 INDIVIDUAL EMPL. RIGHTS MANUAL (BNA) 205 (Oct. 1989).
8. In 1987, the Board of Trustees of the American Medical Association
recommended mandatory AIDS testing of blood, tissue and semen donors, immigrants, federal and state prison inmates and military personnel. Prevention and
Control of Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome: An Interim Report, 258 J. A.M.A.
2097-2101 (1987).
9. Testing, supra note 6, at 65-70 (screening of donated blood has become
"standard operating procedure").
10. Testing, supra note 6, at 70-77; see also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:230
(West Supp. 1990) (repealed after six months); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 204
(1988) (repealed after twenty months). AIDS testing of applicants for marriage
licenses was recommended as early as 1985 by the editor of the Journal of the
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patients, 3 prisoners, 14 prostitutes, 5 pregnant women,' 6 foster childern,' 7 and those who may have committed sex crimes.' 8 Others who
American Medical Association. Lundberg, The Age of AIDS: A Great Time For
Defensive Living, 253 J. A.M.A 3440 (June 21, 1985).
11. 52 Fed. Reg. 32,540 (1987); 8 C.F.R. §245(a.4) 9ii; see also Testing, supra

note 6, at 75.

12. See Army Reg. 600-110, Identification, Surveillance, and Administration
of Personnel Infected with Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) (March 11, 1988).

The military tests all recruits, excluding from service those that test positive. Reserve

Officer Training Corps members and Service Academy Cadets who test positive are
disenrolled and discharged. Active duty personnel that test positive are retained, but
the military may revoke their security clearances and access to classified material and
remove their flight privileges. 509 INDIVIDUAL EMPL. RIGHTS MANUAL (BNA) 213
(May, 1988). A federal District Court has upheld the exclusion policy against a suit

by several navy recruits excluded after a positive AIDS test. Batten v. Dep't of the

Navy, No. CA 85-4108 (D. D.C., Jan. 18., 1986).
13. Testing, supra note 6, at 77; see generally Hagen, Klemens, Meyer &
Pauker, Routine Preoperative Screening for HIV: Does the Risk to the Surgeon
Outweigh the Risk to the Patient?, 259 J. A.M.A. 1357 (March 4, 1988).
14. Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188 (10th Cir. 1989) (AIDS testing of prisoners);
Harris v. Thigpen, 727 F.Supp. 1564 (M.D. Ala. 1990) (AIDS testing of prisoners);
see Testing, supra note 6, at 81; Branham, Opening the Bloodgates: The Blood
Testing of Prisonersfor the AIDS Virus, 20 CONN. L. REv. 763 (1988).
15. Testing, supra note 6, at 91; see, e.g. NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 201.354,
201.356 (Michie Supp. 1988) (mandatory AIDS testing of anyone arrested for engaging
in prostitution outside the confines of a licensed establishment); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
38, para. 1005-5-3(g) (Smith-Hurd 1989) (persons convicted of either prostitution or
the soliciting of a prostitute are required to submit to AIDS testing).
16. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 384.31 (West 1989) (authorizing prenatal screening for
all sexually transmitted diseases).
17. Testing, supra note 6, at 96 ("The C[enter for] D[isease] C[ontrol] has
recommended that 'foster care agencies should consider adding [HIV] screening to
their routine medical evaluations of children at increased risk of infection . .. ');
see, e.g., Centersfor Disease Control, Education and Foster Careof Children Infected
with Human T-Lymphotrophic Virus Type IIl/Lymphoadenopath-associatedVirus,
34 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT 517, 517-21 (1985).
18. See People v. Cook, 143 A.D.2d 486, 532 N.Y.S.2d 940 (App. Div. 1988)
(constitutional rights of defendant who pled guilty to rape not violated by mandatory
AIDS test); New York v. Durham, 146 Misc. 2d 913, 553 N.Y.S.2d 944 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1990) (where the subject had raped and sodomized the victim and then announced
he was an AIDS carrier); People v. Thomas, 139 Misc. 2d 1072, 529 N.Y.S.2d 429
(Co.Ct. 1988) (where the subject raped and sodomized the victim).
Legislatures have taken a varied approach to the issue of what showing is
required from the state in order to test a defendant. See TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE
ANN. § 21.31 (Vernon 1989) (mandatory testing of anyone indicted for sexual assault);
COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-3-415 (Supp. 1989) (testing of anyone bound over for trial on
a sexual offense involving penetration); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-5-3(g)
(Smith-Hurd 1989) (testing of those convicted of sexual assault); 1987 Or. Laws 600
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have been subjected to testing include the members of the United
States Foreign Service, 19 public school teachers, 20 firemen, 21 those who
work with the mentally retarded, 22 drug offenders, 23 and claimants
under the Workmen's Compensation Act. 24 Yet another response to
the crises has been to authorize mandatory testing of private individuals for the AIDS virus after the occurrence of contact with a public
safety officer that gives rise to fear of transmission, such as a biting
or spitting incident, where there is neither a heavily regulated environment nor reason to believe the attacker may be an AIDS carrier. 25
This form of mandatory AIDS testing, in the absence of the likelihood
of transmission or a highly regulated environment, is the focus of this

comment.
During times of perceived crisis, it is extremely important to look
with a critical eye on lawmakers' attempts to deal with what is seen

(testing of convicted of sexual assault); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.24.340 (West
1989) (testing of convicted of sexual assault). In some states, it has been made a
crime to knowingly transmit the virus. See generally Robinson, Aids and the Criminal
Law: Traditional Approaches and a New Statutory Proposal, 14 HOFSTRA L. REV.
91 (1985); Closen, A Proposal to Repeal the Illinois HIV Transmission Statute, 78
ILL. B.J. 592 (1990), and the cases and statutes cited therein.
19. See Local 1812 Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Department of State,
662 F. Supp. 50 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (requiring employees of the Foreign Service to
submit to AIDS testing); see generally Note, Mandatory Testing of Public Employees
for the Human Immunodeficiency Virus: The Fourth Amendment and Medical
Reasonableness, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 720 (1990).

20. In June 1987, the Georgia State Board of Education approved a policy
mandating AIDS testing of public school teachers suspected of having AIDS. If a
teacher refuses to take the test, or has AIDS and fails to inform the school district,
he or she may be fired for insubordination. See 509 INDrvJuAL EM'L. RIGHTS (BNA)
211 (May, 1989).
21. Anonymous Fireman v. City of Willoughby, AIDS Litigation Reporter 920
(May 27, 1988), No. C-88-1182 (N.D. Ohio filed 1988) (mandatory AIDS testing of
firemen).
22. Glover v. Eastern Neb. Community Office of Retardation, 867 F.2d 461
(8th Cir.) (testing of those who work with the mentally retarded), cert. denied, 110
S. Ct. 321 (1989).
23. WASH. REv. CODE § 70.24.340 (Supp. 1991) (testing of those convicted of
a crime "associated with the use of hypodermic needles").
24. WASH. REv. CODE § 70.24.330 (Supp. 1991) (claimants under Washington's
Workmen's Compensation Act, Title 51, will be required to submit to AIDS testing
if the Department of Labor and Industries feels his or her AIDS status is relevant).
25. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 199.97 (West 1990) (transfer of
CODE ANN. § 21.31 (Vernon
1989) (transfer of bodily fluid).

bodily fluids to a peace officer); TExAs Cram. PROC.
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as a menace to our society. As Justice Marshall wrote last term:
History teaches that grave threats to liberty often come in
times of urgency, when constitutional rights seem too extravagant to endure. The World War II relocation-camp cases
[citations omitted] and the Red Scare and McCarthy-Era in-

ternal subversion cases [citations omitted] are only the most
extreme reminders that when we allow fundamental freedoms
to be sacrificed in the name of a real or perceived exigency,
we invariably come to regret it.26

Justice Marshall's caveat above, from his dissent in Skinner v.
27
Railway Labor Executive Association, is all too plainly implicated
by statutory schemes for mandatory AIDS testing. This comment will
address itself to analysis of the type of reaction by government to the

AIDS crises as embodied by California Health and Safety Code ch.
1.20 §199.97, where private individuals may be tested despite a lack
of any reason to believe they may carry the AIDS virus.2 The analysis

26. Skinner v. Railway Labor Exec. Ass'n., 489 U.S. 602, 635 (1989) (Marshall,
In Skinner, the Supreme Court reviewed a program initiated by the
dissenting).
J.,
Transportation Department that mandated suspicionless drug testing of railway
employees in the wake of several drug-related train accidents that resulted in economic
loss, injury and death. Though the Court recognized that the drug tests were a search
for purposes of the fourth amendment, the Court found "special needs" were present
in the government's interests in preventing serious train accidents. Citing a line of
cases on the "administrative search" exception to the fourth amendment, see infra
note 44, the Court held those "special needs" sufficient to override the usual fourth
amendment prerequisites of a warrant, piobable cause and individualized suspicion,
and the testing scheme was upheld. See infra notes 47-52 and accompanying text.
27. Id.
28. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 199.97 (West 1990) provides, inter alia, for
mandatory AIDS testing of:
Any person charged in any criminal complaint filed with a magistrate or
court ... in which it is alleged . . . that the defendant . . . interfered with
the official duties of a peace officer . . . by biting, scratching, spitting, or
transferring blood or other bodily fluids on, upon, or through the skin or
membranes of a peace officer." To have the test ordered, the petitioner
must show that "probable cause exists to believe that a possible transfer of
blood, saliva, semen, or other bodily fluid took place between the defendant
... and the peace officer.
Note, however, there is no requirement to show probable cause that the desired
evidence - that the subject has the AIDS virus - will be found.
Though this paper shall focus on California's testing scheme, a similar program
exists in Washington, and analogous constitutional questions arise. Under Washington
law, any state or local health official who has been exposed to the blood of another
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will closely follow the "special needs" analysis applied in Skinner and
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab29 to the mandatory
drug testing of railroad employees and United States Customs agents.3 0
First, it will ask if there are "special needs beyond the normal
requirements of law enforcement" that may justify departure from
the usual warrant and probable cause procedures. Second, the analysis
will determine how the AIDS testing procedure serves the traditional
functions of a warrant. The third question to be addressed is whether
some form of individualized suspicion that the subject is a carrier of
the AIDS virus should be required. Fourth, the extent to which the
asserted "special needs" rise to the level of compelling state interests
will be examined, and fifth, the state interest will be balanced against
the intrusion upon individual liberty. Finally, the conclusion will be
reached that in order for mandatory AIDS testing in this setting to
qualify as presenting "special needs" under the Skinner evaluation, a
new and radically different analysis must be adopted by the United
States Supreme Court.
II.

CALIFORNIA'S PROPOSITION

96

AND JOHNETTA J. V. MUNICIPAL

COURT

In the 1988 general election, the voters of California voted for
Proposition 96, an initiative that provides, inter alia, for mandatory
AIDS testing. The initiative, as subsequently codified by the California
legislature, provides for mandatory AIDS testing of:
any person charged in any criminal complaint filed with a
magistrate or court . . . in which it is alleged . . . that the
defendant . . . interfered with the official duties of a peace
officer ... by biting, scratching, spitting, or transferring
blood or other bodily fluids on, upon, or through the skin or
membranes of a peace officer.3"
individual in the course of employment may request that an AIDS test of the owner
of the blood be ordered by health officials. If the individual refuses to be tested, a
hearing is held to determine whether there was a "substantial exposure" to the blood
which presented a possible risk for transmission of AIDS. If the court so finds, the
test may be ordered. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.24.340(4) (Supp. 1991).
29. 489 U.S. 656 (1989). In Von Raab, the Court upheld mandatory suspicionless drug testing of certain employees of the United States Customs Service because
the threat drug-impaired customs agents presented to our national 'war on drugs'
was a special need that justified obviation of the usual warrant and probable cause
requirements of the fourth amendment. See infra notes 53-60 and the accompanying
text.
30. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
31. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 199.97 (West 1990). For a discussion of
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32
To have the test ordered, the petitioner must show that "probable cause exists to believe that a possible transfer of blood, saliva,
semen, or other bodily fluid took place between the defendant ...
and the peace officer." 33 However, there is no requirement to show
probable cause that the desired evidence - that the subject has the
AIDS virus - will be found.34
During a child dependency hearing in San Francisco, Johnetta J.
became violent when a sheriff's deputy tried to remove her from the
35
courtroom, and inflicted a deep bite on the deputy's arm. Johnetta
J. was charged with felony assault on a police officer, which in turn
activated Proposition 96. Pursuant to a motion under the statute by,
the bite victim, an order was issued by the Municipal Court of San
Francisco directing Johnetta to submit to mandatory testing for the
AIDS virus. While the appeal was technically moot because it came
too late to avert the testing ordered by the trial court, the appellate
court chose to hear the case based solely on the importance of the
36
issues raised.
37
In Johnetta J. v. the Municipal Court, the appellate court
analyzed the statutory provision allowing for a mandatory AIDS test
when a public safety officer is bitten under the aegis of the "special
needs" exception to the fourth amendment's warrant and probable
cause requirements.38 Finding "special needs" in the government's
interest in protecting the health of public safety employees, the court
held that mandatory AIDS testing of someone who has inflicted a
subcutaneous bite on a police officer does not violate the fourth
39
amendment prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures. In

the provisions of Proposition 96 authorizing testing of sex offenders, see Note, AIDS,

Rape, and the Fourth Amendment: Schemes for Mandatory AIDS Testing of Sex

Offenders, 43 VAND. L. REv. 1607, 1624-27 (1990) [hereinafter Rape].
32. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 199.97 (West 1990) (the petitioner(s) may
be a "peace officer, firefighter, or emergency medical personnel").
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Johnetta J. v. Municipal Court, 218 Cal. App. 3d 1255, 1261, 267 Cal.
Rptr. 666, 668 (1990).
36. Johnetta J., 218 Cal. App. 3d at 1260, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 668 (1990).
37. 218 Cal. App. 3d 1255, 267 Cal. Rptr. 666 (1990).
38. Johnetta J., 218 Cal. App. 3rd at 1272, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 676; see Skinner
v. Railway Labor Exec. Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989); National Treasury Employees
Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
39. Johnetta J., 218 Cal. App. 3d at 1300, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 685. U.S.
CONSTITUTION, amendment IV. See generally, LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE: A TREATISE, ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT (1987); LAFAVE & ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE,
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so holding, the court also found that the substantial government
interest in testing the biter outweighs the "minimal intrusion" of an
AIDS test, 40 as well as any psychological impact a positive result may
have on the subject of a forced AIDS test. 4'
III.

A.

SKINNER AND VON RAAB: THE "SPECIAL NEEDS" EXCEPTION AS
APPLIED TO A BODILY SEARCH
ARE THERE "SPECIAL NEEDS?"

The United States Supreme Court has recently decided two cases
on the constitutionality of mandatory drug testing42 that affect privacy
interests in a manner clearly analogous to those at stake in Johnetta
J43 in that they involve blood tests in the absence
of a warrant,
probable cause, and even individualized suspicion. In the two cases,
relying on a series of cases delineating what has come to be called the
"administrative search" exception to the fourth amendment," the
110-231; Anderson, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment, 117
Mm. L. REV. 301 (1987); Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH.
L. REV. 1468 (1985); Campell, Defining a Fourth Amendment Search: A Critique of
the Supreme Court's Post Katz Jurisprudence, 61 WASH. U. L. REv. 191 (1985);
Lawis, An Historical Review of the Fourth Amendment, 60 Wis. B. BULL. 15 (1987);
Serr, Great Expectations of Privacy: A New Model for Fourth Amendment Protection, 77 MINN. L. REV. 583 (1989).
40. Johnetta J. v. Municipal Court, 218 Cal. App. 3d 1255, 267, Cal. Rptr.
666, 686.
41. Id.
42. Skinner v. Railway Labor Exec. Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989); National
Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
43. See Johnetta J. v. Municipal Court, 218 Cal. App. 3d at 1271, 267 Cal.
Rptr. at 675.
44. Certainly a central element in most of the "special needs" cases is the
administrative nature of the search in a highly regulated environment. See Griffin v.
Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987) (interest of government in searching of probationers'
homes); O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987) (special needs of the government
as employer); New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987) (searches of businesses
engaged in activities subject to high levels of regulation); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469
U.S. 325 (1985) (the need of schools to maintain security and order and an environment conducive to learning); Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981) (need of
government to regulate stone quarries and mines); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520
(1979) (need of prison officials to regulate safety in prisons by cavity searches of
prisoners); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560 (1976) (special need
of the federal government to control illegal movement of persons over its borders).
United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972) (gun dealers); For a discussion of the
administrative search exception, see generally Killburn, Fourth Amendment Work-
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Court found that the "special needs" implicated by mandatory drug

testing of railroad and United States Customs Service employees
justified departure from the usual warrant and probable cause requirements by outweighing the individual privacy interests asserted in
opposition to them. 4 By careful analysis, it is possible to speculate

how the testing scheme approved in Johnetta J. would withstand an
appeal to the United States Supreme Court under the current precedent.
The special needs that justified dispensing with the warrant and
probable cause procedures in Skinner were based largely on the threat
to public safety presented by the operation of a train by a person

under the influence of drugs or alcohol.4 7 The Court took notice of

strong evidence that abuse of controlled substances presented a sig48
nificant threat to the safe operation of the nation's railroads, citing
an eight year Federal Railroad Administration study that showed drug

use to be a causative factor in at least 21 train accidents that resulted

in twenty-five fatalities, sixty-one injuries and nineteen million dollars
in property damage.4 9 The Court found "'special needs' beyond
normal law enforcement that may justify departures from the usual
warrant and probable cause requirements," 5 0 concluding that man-

datory drug testing of railroad employees in certain situations would

5
further safe operation by assisting in investigation of accidents and
deterring drug use.52
Similarly, in National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,"
where certain employees of the U.S. Customs Service were tested for

Related Searches By Government Employers Valid On 'Reasonable' Grounds, 78 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 763 (1988); Reich, Administrative Searches for Evidence of
Crime, 5 TouRo L. REV. 31 (1988); Searle, The 'Administrative' Search From Dewey
To Burger: Dismantling The Fourth Amendment, 16 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 261
(1989); Wax, The Fourth Amendment, Administrative Searches and the Loss of
Liberty, 18 ENV'T. 911; Comment, Search and Seizure: O'Connor v. Ortega, 'He Hit
Me First,' 56 UMKC L. REV. 411 (1988).
45. Skinner, 489 U.S. 602 (1989); Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
46. Johnetta J. v. Municipal Court, 218 Cal. App. 3d 1255, 267 Cal. Rptr.
666 (1990).
47. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 607.
48. Id.
49. Id. (quoting 48 Fed. Reg. 30726 (1983)).
50. Id. at 620.
51. Id. at 629-32.
52. Skinner v. Railway Labor Exec. Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 630 (1989).
53. 489 U.S. 656 (1989). See generally Note, National Treasury Employees
Union v. Von Raab: The Fourth Amendment Hangs in the Balance 68 N.C.L. REV.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. I I

drug use, the Court found "special needs" in the government's
interests in preventing promotion of drug users to sensitive positions,5 4
protecting the safety and integrity of our borders (which Custom
Service agents have the duty of guarding against drug-smuggling), 5
deterring employee drug use 5 6 and preventing armed, drug-impaired
employees from presenting a danger to fellow agents and the public. 7
Though there was little evidence to show a prevalent drug problem
among employees of the Customs Service, 8 the Court held that the
lack of such a relationship was not dispositive of the government's
special needs: "Where, as here, the possible harm against which the
Government seeks to guard is substantial, the need to prevent its
occurrence furnishes an ample justification for reasonable searches
calculated to advance the Government's goal." 5 9 The Court defined
what degree of harm it felt was "substantial" by citing the rationale
for allowing warrantless searches of airline passengers: "When the
risk is the jeopardy to hundreds of human lives and millions of dollars
of property inherent in the pirating or blowing up of a large airplane,
that danger alone meets the test of reasonableness. " ' 60
Thus, a careful reading of Skinner and Von Raab reveals that
the "special needs" which may justify obviation of the normal warrant
and probable cause standards in the blood test context may be found
in one of two ways. First, under Skinner, "special needs" may exist
in response to an already existing and empirically demonstrable evil
that substantially threatens a state interest. 1 Second, under Von Raab,
"special needs" may be found in the government's efforts to prevent
a threatened harm that is of substantial severity, even if the harm has
62
not been demonstrated to exist at present.
389 (1990); James, The Constitutionality of FederalEmployee Drug Testing: National
Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 38 AM. U.L. REV. 109 (1988); Mazo,
Yellow Rows of Test Tubes: Due Process Constraints on Discharges of Public
Employees Based on Drug Urinalysis Testing, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1623 (1987); Note,
Mandatory Drug Testing of Public Employees and the Fourth Amendment: National
Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 14 S.U.L. REV. 269 (1987).
54. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 666
(1989).
55. Id. at 668-69.

56. Id. at 670-71.
57. Id.

58. In fact, only 5 of the 3,600 employees tested for drugs under the program

came out positive. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656,
673 (1989).
59. Id. at 674-75.
60. Id. at 675 n. 3 (quoting United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496, 500 (5th

Cir. 1974) (emphasis in the original)).

61. See supra notes 47-54 and the accompanying text.
62. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 674-75
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Relying on both Skinner and Von Raab, in Johnetta J. v.
Municipal Court the California Court of Appeals found "special
needs" in the government's interest in reducing a public safety officer's fear of infection by the AIDS virus 63 after being bitten by
another. While conceding there are no documented cases of transmission of the AIDS virus through a bite, 64 (and in fact concluding that
(1989); see supra notes 53-60 and the accompanying text. Relying on the Von Raab
analysis, the Ninth Circuit has found "special needs" that justify random, suspicionless drug testing of Federal Aviation Administration employees, even in the absence
of any evidence that there is an actual drug problem. See Bluestein v. Skinner, 908
F.2d 451 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 1990 WL 193241 (1991).
63. Johnetta J. v. Municipal Court, 218 Cal. App. 3rd 1255, 1280, 267 Cal.
Rptr. 666, 681 (1990).
64. Id. at 1267-69, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 672-674. The case law is full of similar
findings. See United States v. Moore, 846 F.2d 1163, 1168 (8th Cir. 1988) ("The
evidence established that there are no well-proven cases of AIDS transmission by a
bite; that contact with saliva has never been shown to transmit the disease; and that
in one case a person who had been deeply bitten by a person with AIDS tested
negative several months later."); Baxter v. City of Belleville, 720 F. Supp. 720, 725
(S.D. 11. 1989) ("There is also no medical evidence of transmission through saliva.")Xover v. Eastern Neb. Community Office of Retardation, 686 F. Supp. 243,
246, 249, 251 (D. Neb. 1988) ("Although the virus may be found in tears or saliva,
no reported transmissions via these fluids have been reported."), aff'd, 867 F.2d 461
(8th Cir. 1989); Thomas v. Atascadero Unified School Dist., 662 F. Supp. 376, 380
(C.D. Cal. 1987) ("The overwhelming weight of medical evidence is that the AIDS
virus is not transmitted by human bites, even bites that break the skin."); Doe v.
Borough of Barrington, 729 F. Supp. 376, 380 (D.N.J. 1990) ("Although HIV has
been detected in other bodily fluids such as saliva and urine, the virus is much less
concentrated, and there are no known cases of transmission of the virus by such
means. The Centers for Disease Control .

.

. terms the risk of infection from such

fluids as 'extremely low or nonexistent."'); Johnetta J., 267 Cal.Rptr. at 673 (no
case of AIDS transmission by a bite has ever been reported, and that the chances of
such transmission are exceedingly remote) (quoting United States Department of
Health and Human Services, Public Health Service, Centers for Disease Control,
Guidelines for Prevention of Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus and
Hepatitis-B Virus to Health-Careand Public Safety Workers 10, (Feb. 1989)); District
27 Community School Board v. Board of Educ., 130 Misc.2d 398, 502 N.Y.S.2d
325, 332 ( N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986) ("[tlhe epidemiological data indicat[es] no evidence
that saliva has ever been a means of transmission. .. ").
Charges have been dropped in several cases where evidence that AIDS could not
be spread by a bite was dispositive. See, e.g., People v. Sanders, New York Times,
June 10, 1987, at A29, (charges reduced against prostitute who bit police officer);
People v. St. John, No. 90 CR 10869 (Cook County Circuit Court 1990) (charges
dropped against defendant who bit and scratch officers when she was arrested).
The literature, both legal and medical, has almost unanimously agreed. "Studies
and analyses of persons performing mouth to mouth resuscitation on AIDS victims,
health care workers bitten by AIDS patients and children bitten by children with
AIDS have failed to show transmission." CLOSEN, AIDS: CASES AND MATERIALS 124
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the court felt that

the test was useful in allaying the officer's fear of infection and in

aiding his or her physician in any treatment that might be called for. 66

Though the court in Johnetta J.67 relied heavily on the "special
needs" doctrine of both Skinner and Von Raab, it is not clear that
such reliance is warranted by the factual circumstances. 68 The first

(1989); Transmission of AIDS through a bite is "extremely unlikely." Stansbury,
Deadly and Dangerous Weapons and AIDS: The Moore Analysis is Likely to Be
Dangerous, 74 IOWA L. REV. 951, 954 at note 47 (1989) (quoting NATIONAL INSTITUTE
OF JUSTICE, AIDS IN CORREcTIoNAL FAcIrrms: ISSUES AND OPTIONS 15 (3d ed. 1988));
"Current evidence shows that AIDS is spread only by direct blood-to-blood or bloodto-semen exchange (and possibly through breast milk).

.

." Testing, supra note 6, at

56. "The virus has been detected in saliva, however, there has not been a documented
case of transmission through it." Constitutional Implications, supra note 7, at 225;
see generally Lifson, Do Alternate Modes for Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus Exist? 259 J. A.M.A. 1353-56 (1988). A recent study indicates that
saliva may actually have properties that protect the body from the AIDS virus. N.
Y. TIMES, May 6, 1988, at A16, col. 4.

The conclusion that AIDS is not transferred by biting is strengthened by a recent
case study involving a severely retarded man infected with the virus who constantly
attacked the health care workers attending him. Over time, the subject inflicted at
least eight bites, three involving broken skin, and twenty-three scratches on the
workers. The subject frequently had large amounts of blood, saliva and pus in his
mouth and semen, fecal matter and blood under his fingernails. Despite what were
optimum conditions for transmission if it were possible, after a two and one half
year follow up study, there was no evidence that any of the health care workers
attacked had been infected with the AIDS virus. Defendant's Memorandum in
Opposition to State's Motion for Taking of Blood Sample, at Exhibit D, p. 3-4
(statement of Dr. Shirley Fannin, M.D.), People v. St. John, No. 90 CR 10869
(Cook County, Illinois 1990) (prosecution for transmission of AIDS virus under ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 12-16.2(a)(1)), citing Lack of Transmission of HIV through
Human Bite and Scratches, 1 JOURNAL OF ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROME
505 (1988).
65. Johnetta J. v. Municipal Court, 218 Cal. App. 3rd 1255, 1268, 267 Cal.
Rptr. 666, 673.
66. Johnetta J., 218 Cal. App. 3d at 1280-81, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 691-82.
67. Id.
68. The focus of Skinner and Von Raab on the highly regulated nature of the
environment was applied to the special needs of a hospital to know the AIDS test
results of one of its nurses in Leckelt v. Board of Comm'rs of Hosp. Dist. No. 1,
909 F.2d 820 (5th Cir. 1990), decided subsequent to Johnetta J. In Leckelt, the
petitioner was a nurse at the defendant hospital. Several factors indicated that Leckelt
was infected with the AIDS virus, including his eight-year homosexual relationship
with a man who had recently died of AIDS and his treatment in 1984 for lymphadenopathy, a condition that is symptomatic of recent AIDS infection. Fearing that he
may have contracted the disease, Leckelt had himself tested for AIDS. When Leckelt
was home from work because of a draining lesion under his arm, the hospital board
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and most obvious distinction in the rationales of the three cases is

that the Skinner and Von Raab "special needs" dealt with concerns
for the safety, and perhaps the very lives, of large numbers of people,

policy issues of pressing national import and potentially large amounts
of property damage. Johnetta J. however, focuses on the emotional
state (and to a lesser degree the physical well-being) of an individual
involved in an isolated event with only hypothetical consequences.

Moveover, neither the 'existing evil' approach of Skinner nor the
'substantial threat' present in Von Raab is apparent in the Johnetta
J. court's finding of a special need: there are no reported cases of
AIDS transmission by a bite and the medical evidence strongly

indicates such transmission is almost impossible. 69 Thus, under either
of the appropriate analyses set forth by Supreme Court precedent,

the special needs found by the court in Johnetta J. lack the requisite

indicia to justify obviation of the normal warrant and probable cause
procedures.70

requested that Leckelt reveal the results of his AIDS test to them. Leckelt refused,
and the hospital stopped scheduling him to work, even though he had received
medical clearance to return after his running lesion healed. Id. at 821-24. The district
court upheld the suspension and demand for the test results, Leckelt v. Board of
Comm'rs of Hosp. Dist. No. 1, 714 F. Supp. 1377, 1392 (E.D. La. 1989), and the
appellate court affirmed, Leckelt v. Board of Comm'rs of Hosp. Dist. No. 1, 909
F.2d 820, 833 (5th Cir. 1990). Relying on the highly regulated nature of the hospital
environment, where all employees were required to report infectious diseases and
undergo serological tests whenever required, the appellate court upheld the hospital's
suspension of Leckelt until he provided the results of the AIDS test. The appellate
court found Skinner v. Ry. Labor Exec. Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 controlling, and held
that Leckelt's expectation of privacy was reduced by his participation in a highly
regulated industry, and because of his position as a nurse which "provided opportunities for HIV transmission." Leckelt, 909 F.2d at 833. Also important was the
presence of the factors which reasonably led the hospital to believe that he was
indeed infected with the virus. The appellate court also noted the intrusion on
Leckelt's privacy was very limited because the hospital merely wanted the results of
the test he had voluntarily undergone earlier, and did not require him to undergo
any additional procedures. Leckelt, 909 F.2d at 833, n. 22.
The court also rejected plaintiff's claims that defendant's actions had violated
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794, Leckelt, 909 F.2d at
826-30.
Curiously, in the very same case, the Office of Civil Rights of the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services, with whom the plaintiff had filed a
complaint, found the defendant's action to be a violation of § 504. Leckelt v. Board
of Commissioners, AIDS Litigation Rptr. 3998 (Feb. 9, 1990).
69. See supra note 64.

70. Skinner v. National Railway Labor Exec. Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 618-21
(1989).
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B. ARE THE FUNCTIONS OF A WARRANT" PROTECTED BY THE
STATUTORY TESTING PROCEDURE?

Assuming, arguendo, that the Court would find that a general
interest in protecting the health and safety of its police officers
constitutes "special needs," the next step in the analysis is to balance
the efficacy of the warrant in protecting the rights of the subject
against the government's "special needs. '7 2 The primary functions of
a search warrant based on probable cause, as set out by the Court in
Skinner,73 are to narrowly define the scope of the search, and to
ensure that the intrusion is warranted by law.74 Here, as in Skinner,
the statute authorizing the search subsumes the first of those functions
itself by narrowly limiting the search to the test for the AIDS virus
and other communicable diseases. 75 Thus the first function of a
warrant, to narrowly define the scope of the search, is fulfilled by
the proscribed limits of the testing procedure itself.
The second function of a search warrant is to put the subject on
notice that the intrusion is warranted by law. In both Skinner and
Von Raab, and other cases on the administrative "special needs"
exception, 76 the Court held that the covered employees were obviously
on notice of the lawfulness of the reduction in their privacy expectation because of their closely regulated employment situation. 77 Here,
71. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 621-2. See generally VAN DUIZEND,

THE SEARCH

(Van Duizend, Sutton, Karter, eds. 1985); LAFAVE & ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (1985).
72. Skinner v. Railway Labor Exec. Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 621 (1989).
73. Id.at 621-22.
74. Id.
75. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 199.98 (West 1990) provides, inter alia, for
mandatory AIDS testing of:
Any person charged in any criminal complaint filed with a magistrate or
court ... in which it is alleged . . .that the defendant . . .interfered with
the official duties of a peace officer . . . by biting, scratching, spitting, or
transferring blood or other bodily fluids on, upon, or through the skin or
membranes of a peace officer. To have the test ordered, the petitioner must
show that "probable cause exists to believe that a possible transfer of blood,
saliva, semen, or other bodily fluid took place between the defendant ...
and the peace officer.
There is no requirement to show probable cause that the desired evidence -that the
subject has the AIDS virus - will be found, only probable cause that the transfer of
bodily fluids took place.
76. See supra note 44.
77. Skinner v. National Railway Labor Executive A'ssn, 489 U.S. 602, 627;
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 666-67; Marshall
v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 313 (1978) ("Certain industries have such a history
WARRANT PROCESS: PRECONCEPTIONS, PERCEPTIONS, PRACTICES,
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however, the subject is a private citizen, not a public employee in a
highly regulated industry,7 8 and therefore notice, if it may be inferred,
must come from a different source than the subject's employment
situation. In response to this distinction, the argument has been
effectively made that a criminal assault on a peace officer is also a
highly regulated activity, in the sense that it is forbidden by law, and
thus engaging in such activity puts the actor on notice that his privacy
79
rights may be legally diminished.
Thus it seems clear that the efficacy of a warrant in furthering
the privacy rights of the biter is minimal, because the primary
functions of a warrant are subsumed into the structure of the testing
procedure. However, the analysis does not end at this point. The
strength of the government's interests in suspending the warrant
requirement must be analyzed as well, and it is not so clear that the

remaining elements of this balancing analysis fall in favor of the
government's special need and to the detriment of the traditional
warrant procedure.

The most compelling argument in favor of the government's
interest in the obviation of the warrant requirement in Skinner was
that "the burden of obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate the
governmental purpose behind the search." 80 In Skinner, the require-

of government oversight that no reasonable expectation of privacy ...
ist .

. . . ");

see generally supra note 44.

could ex-

For a discussion of drug testing in the government work place, see Note, A
Proposalfor Mandatory Drug Testing of Federal Civilian Employees, 62 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 322 (1987); Joseph, Fourth Amendment Implications of Public Sector Work
Place Drug Testing, 11 NOVA L. J. 605 (1987); Note, The Drug-Free Federal
Workplace: A Question of Reasonableness, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 215 (1987);
McDermott and Jones, Mandatory Random Drug-Testing in the United States
Department of Transportation- A Fourth Amendment Analysis, 17 TRANsP. L.J.
1 (1988); Petrini, Drug Testing and Public Employment: Toward A RationalApplication of the Fourth Amendment, 51 LAW & CoNTEmp. PROBS. 253 (1988); Sokolowksi, Government Drug Testing: A Question of Reasonableness, 43 VAND. L. REV.
1343 (1990); Comment, Do You Abandon All ConstitutionalProtectionsby Accepting
Employment with the Government?: Mandatory Drug Testing of Government Employees Violates the Fourth Amendment, 28 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 169 (1988); Note,
Drug Testing of Government Employees and the Fourth Amendment: The Need for
a Reasonable Suspicion Standard, 62 NOTRE DAmE L. REV. 1063 (1987).
78. See supra note 44 infra note 109, and the accompanying text.
79. Note, Mandatory AIDS Testing: The Slow Death of Fourth Amendment
Protection?, 20 PAC. L.J. 1413, 1438 (1989).
80. Skinner v. Railway Labor Exec. Comm., 489 U.S. 602, 623 (1989) (quoting
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 533 (1967).
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ment of a warrant hampered the government's objectives in two ways.
First, because evidence of drug use metabolizes out of one's system
fairly quickly, to wait for a warrant could allow a drug-impaired
employee to escape a telling positive result.8 Second, the Court found
that requiring railroad supervisors, who have the responsibility for
administering the testing program, to master the complexity of the
82
warrant system would be counterproductive.
The concerns in the AIDS testing area are entirely different.
Unlike drug testing in either Skinner or Von Raab, there is no
possibility that the evidence will metabolize out of the subject's
system, necessitating immediate testing.83 The California appellate
court reasoned that the testing of the subject's blood test had medical
utility in treating the victim because it provides information upon
which the decisions relating to treatment and monitoring of the patient
may be based.8 4 However, because of the inconclusive nature of the
test in determining whether the biter has AIDS85 or whether the virus
was actually transmitted,8 6 it seems that little information useful to
the victim will be gained by testing without reason to suspect the biter
is infected. If probable cause that the biter has AIDS were required,
the intrusion on the biter's privacy would only be necessary when it
87
is at least remotely possible that the virus was indeed transmitted.
Furthermore, the investigatory steps necessary to establishing probable
cause would serve to eliminate unnecessary anxiety on the part of the
bite victim, by providing information on whether or not the biter is
a likely carrier of the virus, thus better serving the goal of the
legislature in allaying the concerns of the patient.8 8 Because evidence
shows that AIDS tests are not foolproof, requiring probable cause

81. See id. at 623.

82. See id. at 623-24.
83. Cf. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-71 (1966) (blood test
administered to petitioner without a warrant after his arrest for drunken driving did
not violate the fourth amendment).
84. Johnetta J. v. Municipal Court, 218 Cal. App. 3d 1255, 1270, 267 Cal.
Rptr. 666, 674 (1990).

85. Id. at 1266, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 672; see also infra notes 169, 170. "It can
be expected that many who test negatively might actually be positive due to recent

exposure to the AIDS virus." Constitutional Implications, supra note 6, at 246
(quoting C. EVERETT Koop, M.D., SC.D., SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT ON ACQUIRED
IMMUNE DIFICIENCY SYNDROME, U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Servs. at 5 (April

3, 1986)).

86. Johnetta J., 218 Cal. App. 3rd at 1269, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 674.
87. See supra note 64 and the accompanying text.
88. Johnetta J., 218 Cal. App. 3rd 1269, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 672.
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that the biter has AIDS would substantially augment the value of the
information gained from the test. Research has shown that testing
large numbers of people who are not members of any high-risk group
"will result in an abnormally high rate of false positives, 9 which
already occur most frequently in tests of non-high risk persons. 9° By
at least requiring probable cause that the biter is a member of a highrisk group prior to the test, the state will be provided with information
that is valuable in assessing the possibility of a misleading result.
The Skinner Court was concerned that if probable cause was
required prior to testing railroad employees for drugs, railroad administrators who administer the testing program would be forced to
master legal intricacies beyond their expertise. 91 In the AIDS testing
context, no similar problem exists, because the probable cause inquiry
92
is a legal determination that would be carried out by judicial officers.
In the absence of fortuitous knowledge that the subject is a member
of a high-risk group 93 or an inadvertent admission of infection, 94 such
a finding could be made with no more investigation than is needed
for any other probable cause determination, and would not hamper
the government interests in testing the biter.
Though AIDS testing involves drawing blood from the subject
much like a blood alcohol test, there is a major distinction between
blood alcohol tests and tests for AIDS. Blood alcohol tests may be
taken without a warrant under Schmerber v. California,95 because the

89. Rape, supra note 31, at 1616 (quoting Barry, Cleary & Feinberg, Screening
for HIV Infection: Risks, Benefits, and the Burden of Proof, 14 LAW, MED. &
HEALTH CARE 259, 263 (1986).

90. Testing, supra note 6, at 40-41.
91. Skinner v. Railway Labor Exec. Ass'n., 489 U.S. 602, 623-24 (1989).
92. CA

HEALTH

&

SAFETY CODE,CODE,

§199.97 (West 1989).

93. Individuals considered at high risk for AIDS include prostitutes, male

homosexuals, and intravenous drug users. See Note, Mandatory AIDS Testing: The

Slow Death of Fourth Amendment Protection?, 20 PAC. L.J. 1413 (1989) (citing C.
Koop, M.D., SC.D., SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT ON ACQUIRED IMMUNE
DEFICIENCY SYNDROME, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, at 15, 18,
19 (Oct. 22, 1986)). It should be noted that only gay men who have not had a
monogamous relationship are considered at high risk for the AIDS virus. Testing,
supra note 6, at 61 ("For example, a gay man who has had few partners and always
EVERETT

preferred safe sexual practices may be less likely to be infected than a heterosexual
woman who prefers anal sex and has had multiple partners.")
94. See Haywood County v. Hudson, 740 S.W.2d 718 (1987) (where the subject,

a murder suspect in custody of the county sheriff, announced to the authorities that
he suffered from AIDS).

95. 384 U.S. 757 (1968).
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alcohol will metabolize out of the subject's blood stream within hours,
and the delay in obtaining a warrant could allow the subject to escape
a positive result. 96 The efficacy of a warrant is further reduced in the
blood alcohol setting by the fact that the subject physically manifests

behavior that leads the officer to conclude that there is a high level
of probable cause that he or she has been drinking. 97 With AIDS

however, there is no need for immediate testing, because the virus is
a permanent fixture in the subject's blood. Also, there is no such
outward manifestation of infection that may lead to a reasonable
belief that the subject has been infected.

A factor in favor of the government's interest in not requiring a
warrant prior to the AIDS test is the fact that the search of the
subject's blood authorized by Proposition 96 is purely administrative. 98
A warrant may not be required by the Court because the "probable

cause standard is peculiarly related to criminal investigations, 99 where
there is a threat of imposition of criminal sanctions. In the adminis-

trative setting, the interest involved often outweighs a need to show
probable cause,' °° and the Court may move ahead to the question of

whether at least some showing of individualized suspicion, an even
lower standard than probable cause, is required.' 0 '
. Thus, it appears that a warrant would provide little additional
protection to the subject of an AIDS test, and the administrative
setting lessens the need for a warrant. However, requiring one does

not hamper the governmental objectives, and may actually further the

governmental interest in allaying the concerns of the patient. 02 Though

96. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-71 (1968).
97. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 768.
98. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 198.98(f) (West 1990) (prohibiting the use
of test results ordered under this chapter as evidence in any criminal or juvenile
proceeding); The distinction between a criminal and an administrative search lies
primarily in the way the seized evidence is used. In the criminal setting, evidence
seized in a premises or body search is used to pursue criminal sanctions, see Schmerber
v. California, 384 U.S. 757. In the administrative setting, however, the evidence is
used to protect the public health or safety, or to insure compliance with the
requirements of the law, see Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 533. See
supra note 44.
99. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 667
(quoting Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 371 (1987)).
100. Id. at 668.
101. Skinner v. Railway Labor Exec. Ass'n., 489 U.S. 602, 624 (1989). See e.g.,
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560 (1976) (discussing the special
need of the federal government to control illegal movement of persons over its
borders).
102. Johnetta J. v. Municipal Court, 218 Cal. Rpt. 1255, 1269, 267 Cal. Rptr.
666, 672 (1990).
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it is unclear how the Court would decide this close issue, if the Court
were to somehow find this mixed result to balance out heavily in
favor of the government's interest in eliminating the warrant, abrogation of the warrant requirement may be justified under Skinner and
Von Raab. 1°3
C.

IS SOME FORM OF INDIVIDUALIZED SUSPICION REQUIRED?

If the Court finds that neither a warrant nor probable cause is
required, the next inquiry is whether some degree of individualized
suspicion, a lower quantum of proof, is required.' °4 The Supreme
Court has devised a two-pronged test for disposing of the individualized suspicion element of a reasonable search in the administrative
context. The analysis first requires that a "minimal" privacy interest
be invaded, and second that the government's interest justifying the
imposition be "important.' ' 15 If these two tests are met, "a search
may be reasonable despite the absence" of individualized suspicion.'°6
In Skinner, the Court relied on four factors to establish that the
drug tests were a "minimal intrusion."'' 7 First, because the tests were
performed at the workplace, and those subjected to the tests were
already at work with limited freedom to leave, the restriction on
movement necessary to effectuate the testing was minimal. 08 Second,
the Court found that a blood test is a minimal intrusion, because
"tests are a commonplace occurrence in these days of periodic physical
examinations and experience with them teaches that the quantity of
blood extracted is minimal and that for most people, the procedure
involves virtually no risk, trauma or pain."109 Third, "the expectations
of privacy of covered employees are diminished by reason of their
participation in an industry that is regulated pervasively to ensure
safety ....."10 Finally, the Court looked to the clear relationship
103. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 621-624; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665-667.
104. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624.
105. Id.
106. Id.

107. Id. Because the magnitude of the government's interest has already been
discussed, see supra notes 39-67 and accompanying text (discussion of whether there
are "special needs") and will again be addressed, see infra notes 144-177 and
accompanying text (whether the "special needs" rise to the level of a compelling
state interest), this portion of the analysis will focus solely on the "minimal intrusion"
prong of the test.
108. Id. at 624-25.
109. Id. at 625 (quoting Schmerber v. California, 382 U.S. 757, 771 (1968)).

110. Skinner v. Railway Labor Exec. Ass'n. 489 U.S. 602, 627 (1989); Cf. Local
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between the government's goal of safety and its concern with the

railroad employees' state of health, stating that the correlation is
obvious: "An idle locomotive

. . .

is harmless. It becomes lethal when

operated negligently by persons who are under the influence of alcohol
or drugs." 'I
In the AIDS testing setting, any restriction on movement of the

biter is only minimal unless the test is performed while he or she is

detained or incarcerated on the assault charge. If the subject is released

and then required by the court order to submit to custody for testing,
albeit temporarily, the restriction on freedom of movement is no
longer "minimal," 2 as defined by Skinner, because it involves more
than being tested at the work place.

More importantly, the Skinner Court's conclusion that blood
testing for alcohol is a minimal intrusion, based on Schmerber v.
California,"3 is of questionable application to an AIDS test. While a

drug test as in Skinner and Von Raab or a blood-alcohol test as in
Schmerber"1 4 may indeed be commonplace and virtually free of risk,

trauma, and pain," 5 that is hardly the case for an AIDS test: "A
person who has been involuntarily tested for AIDS and receives a
positive result may suffer a number of possible injuries. Perhaps first
and foremost among these is the danger of stigmatization and ostracism which may result.""16 The American Medical Association Board
of Trustees has stated:
The stigma which accompanies a diagnosis of AIDS, based on
fear and society's attitude toward IV drug abusers and ho-

1812 Am. Fed'n of Gov't Emp. v. Department of State, 662 F. Supp. 50 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (employees of the Foreign Service may be tested for AIDS based on their
employment in a governmental agency that closely regulates the health of its employees.); Rushton v. Nebraska Public Power, 844 F.2d 567, 566 (8th Cir. 1988)
(conditioning employment of technicians at nuclear power plant upon submission to
urinalysis did not violate the fourth amendment). See generally Remer, The Junking
of the Fourth Amendment: The Closely Regulated Industry Exception to the Warrant
Requirement, New York v. Burger, 25 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 791 (1987) (discussion of
administrative search exception under Burger). See supra note 41.
111. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 628 (quoting Railway Labor Exec. Ass'n v. Burnley,
839 F.2d 575, 593 (9th Cir. 1988)(Alarcon, J., dissenting)).
112. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624-25.
113. 382 U.S. 757 (1966).
114. Schmerber v. California, 382 U.S. 757 (1966).
115. Id. at 771.
116. Doe v. Roe, 139 Misc. 2d 209, 526 N.Y.S.2d 718, 721 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1988).
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mosexuals presents a factor beyond the control of the infected
individual or medicine. An HIV-Seropositive individual who
might live five years or much longer with no overt health
problems, once identified in a community, may be subject to
many and varied discriminations, by family and loved ones,
neighbors and friends, employers and fellow employees" 7 and
other providers of services."'
117. Discrimination in the workplace because of AIDS status is prohibited in
many states. See 509 INDIVIDUAL. EMP.L. RIGHTS MANUAL (BNA) 206 (Oct. 1989)
(California, Georgia, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri and Texas prohibit forms of
discrimination in the workplace based on AIDS status); Comment, AIDS and the
Law: Protecting the HIV-Infected Employee from Discrimination, 57 TENN. L. REV.
539 (1990) (discussing laws of several states and the federal government) [hereinafter
Discrimination].
However, these laws have not served to eliminate the problem, and several
lawsuits based on employment discrimination due to AIDS status have been filed.
See Cronan v. New England Telephone, 1 Individual Employment Rights Cases 658
(D. Mass. 1986) (suit for violation of privacy where employer forced employee to
reveal AIDS status and then refused to let employee return to work and allegedly
revealed test results to co-workers); Shuttleworth v. Broward County, 41 Fed'l Empl.
Pract. Cases (D. So. Fla. 1986) (suit for unlawful discharge based on AIDS status);
In Re Nursing Home and Union, 88 LA 681 (1987) (wrongful discharge of nursing
home employee based on AIDS status); King v. EDS Corp., No. 17039 (Cir. Ct.
Mont Cty, Md. Aug. 14, 1986) (suit for emotional distress where employer removed
all the furniture from an AIDS victim's office, burned it, repainted the walls and
replaced the telephone). See also Comment, AIDS and the Law: Protecting the HIVInfected Employee from Discrimination, 57 TENN. L. REV. 539, 541 n. 14 (1990).
But cf. Williams v. Summer, 648 F. Supp. 510, 1 Individual Empl. Rights Cases
1399 (D. Nev. 1986) (inmate who claimed wrongful exclusion from community work
program because of his AIDS status failed to state a cause of action because statutory
scheme for employment of offenders does not create a constitutionally protected
liberty interest).
118. AMA Board of Trustees Report, Prevention and Control of Acquired
Immunodeficiency Syndrome: An Interim Report, 258 J. A.M.A., 2097, 2098 (1987);
Cf. Doe v. Coughlin, 697 F. Supp. 1234, 1237 (N.D.N.Y. 1988) ("An individual's
decision to tell family members as well as the general community that he is suffering
from an incurable disease, particularly AIDS, is clearly an emotional and sensitive
one fraught with serious implications for that individual"). There can be no doubt
about the discrimination suffered by AIDS patients: "AIDS is the modern equivalent
of leprosy. AIDS, or a suspicion of AIDS, can lead to discrimination in employment,
education, housing and even medical treatment." South Fla. Blood Serv. Inc v.
Rasmussen, 467 So. 2d 798, 802 (1988). Unfortunately, this prejudice occurs in the
courtroom as well, and numerous incidents where judges acted out of irrational fear
of AIDS have been documented. For instance, one judge conducted a sentencing
hearing in the parking lot when the defendant was suspected of having AIDS, because
"lots of space and sunshine" would prevent the spread of AIDS. NEw YORK TIMES,
June 28, 1987, § 4 at 24, col. 1. Three judges in Alabama require defendants with
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The discrimination faced by AIDS sufferers in our society is

shameful and widespread. They have been refused emergency medical
treatment, forced to leave their homes, thrown out of school, fired

from their jobs, barred from courtrooms, denied delivery of their

mail, abandoned by their families, and beaten and left for dead.

19

An AIDS patient threatened with revelation of his or her illness to
others faces ignorant and unbridled hatred from all quarters - friends,
family and strangers alike - to a degree never faced by the drunk

driver in Schmerber.
Finally, "the psychological impact of learning that one is seropositive has been compared to receiving a death sentence. Sequelae
include severe stress and depression, including possible contemplation
of suicide."' 20 Thus it is clear that the impact of AIDS testing on the
subject can be far more intrusive and significant than the routine
testing in either Skinner, Von Raab or Schmerber: a test for an

invariably fatal degenerative disease that has led its subjects to commit
suicide is hardly "routine";

2'

it is immeasurably more significant to

AIDS to enter pleas and receive sentences over the phone. Stansbury, Deadly and

Dangerous Weapons and AIDS: The Moore Analysis is Likely to be Dangerous, 74

L. REV. 951 (1989) (quoting N. Y. Times, Dec. 14, 1988, at A21, col. 1.) The
discrimination against AIDS patients goes beyond the law. Patients have been fired
from their jobs because of their AIDS status, landlords have evicted tenants, and
teachers, beauticians, ambulance drivers, physicians, dentists, therapists, lab technicians, and undertakers have refused to serve AIDS patients. Testing, supra note 6
(quoting McLaughlin, AIDS: An Overview, 4 NEW ENG. J. PUB. POL'Y 15, 28). For
an exhaustive discussion of the discrimination faced by AIDS sufferers, see EPIDEMIC
OF FEAR: A SURVEY OF AIDS DISCRIMINATION IN THE 1980S AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE 1990s, (report of the American Civil Liberties Union AIDS project,
Nan D. Hunter, principal investigator).
IOWA

119. See supra notes 115, 116 and infra note 128; Discrimination, supra note

116, at 540-41.
120. Doe v. Roe, 139 Misc. 2d 209, 526 N.Y.S.2d 718, 721, (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1988). See also Glover v. Eastern Neb. Community Office of Retardation, 686 F.
Supp. 243, 248 (D.Neb. 1988) (mandatory AIDS testing "can lead to disastrous
results, including suicide"), aff'd, 867 F.2d 461 (8th Cir. 1989); Testing, supra note
6, at note 42 ("As would be expected, a positive result can bring on profound gloom,
anxiety and depression, and may increase the risk of suicide, homicide or other
sociopathic behavior.") See generally Marzuk, Tierny, Tardiff, Gross, Morgan, Hsu
& Mann, Increased Risk of Suicide in Persons with AIDS, 259 J. A.M.A. 1333

(1988); see infra note 117.
121. In noting that receiving a positive result from an AIDS test has led to
suicide on several occasions, it has been stated that "the potential for severe, even
fatal, emotional consequences should heighten concerns about inappropriate HIV
antibody testing without proper indications, informed consent, or counseling. The
risk of suicide is one more reason THAT SUCH TESTS SHOULD NEVER BE CONSIDERED AS
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the subject than a test for an intoxicating chemical. While a drug
abuser need fear only deprivation of some liberty (in the form of a
lost job) and perhaps a limited social stigma, the AIDS victim must

face potential discrimination,1 22 ostracism and the unsolicited knowledge of an imminent and painful death.
Even when the dissemination of the test results is closely controlled, it is far from clear that significant harm to the defendant will

not result. Though the California statute limits dissemination of the

results to a need to know basis, numerous entities and individuals

have access to them.' 23 Included among those are the defendant, each
public safety officer involved and his or her employing agency, the
officer in charge and the chief medical officer of the facility in which
such person may be incarcerated or detained,12 4 the State Department
of Health Services,' 25 and the parents or guardian of the defendant if
she is a minor, 26 as well as anyone else to whom disclosure "may be
necessary to obtain medical or psychological care or advice.'

' 27

Not

only does the distribution of the results appear to go beyond what is
necessary to effectuate the state interest in protecting the health of
the bitten employee, but the concerns of the American Medical
Association 2 on the possible effects of mandatory testing on the
subject are plainly implicated as well. Because the results are issued
to public safety agencies, it is conceivable that a known AIDS sufferer
may be subject to discrimination in the availability of emergency
services. 29 Equally clear are the possibilities of ill-treatment by the
'ROUTINE."'

Glass, AIDS and Suicide, 259 J. A.M.A 1369, 1370 (1988) (emphasis

added).
The American Bar Association agrees: "Unlike routine tests and diagnostic
procedures, HIV testing constitutes a MAJOR INTRUSION into the life of the person
tested and can have a profound impact on the individual, his family, friends, and
associates." Report of the AIDS Coordinating Committee, 21 TOLEDO L. REV. 19,
58 (1990) (emphasis added).
122. See supra notes 116, 117.
123. California prohibits the negligent or willful disclosure of AIDS test results
to third parties in all situations except where a health care professional has the
subject's written authorization, or where a test is ordered under the statute relied on
in Johnetta J.. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 199.21, 199.22 (West 1989).
124. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 199.97 (West 1989).
125. Id. at § 199.98(c).
126. Id. at § 199.98(d).
127. Id. at 199.98(e).
128. See supra note 116 and the accompanying text.
129. Doe v. Roe, 526 N.Y.2d at 721. The threat of discrimination against AIDS
sufferers in availability of emergency services is greatest immediately after an accident
or injury, where fear of transmission of the virus could lead to hesitation on the part
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subject's family, because the results are available to a minor's parent
or guardian, 30 and the heavy psychological impact a positive test
result may have on the subject.' In light of the huge risk of emotional
trauma and discriminatory treatment, it can hardly be said that
mandatory AIDS testing involves "virtually no risk, trauma or pain,"'' 3 2
as did the blood testing in Skinner, Von Raab, and Schmerber, but
rather poses the potential of significant trauma and emotional pain
for the subject. Whether this argument, though rejected by the court
in Johnetta J.,133 would be accepted by the United States Supreme
Court is unclear, but there is no ambiguity surrounding the distinctions

in the nature of the intrusion on the subject between a mandatory
AIDS test and a routine test for alcohol or drugs.
The Court's contention in Skinner and Von Raab that the covered
employees had a reduced expectation of privacy because of their
participation in an industry closely regulated3 4 is more easily applied
to these facts. It takes no great intuition to suggest that a criminal
defendant who has assaulted a police officer may well have a diminished expectation of privacy as well, because those who are suspected

of or actually commit crimes are generally on notice of a diminished
right to privacy.' Consequently, the third factor in the minimal
intrusion test withstands analysis.
of a public safety officer rendering aid to the victim. To the victim of a severe injury
requiring immediate treatment, this delay could mean the difference between life and
death.
Such discrimination has been well documented. See Discrimination, supra note
116, at 540 n.11. (New York Department of Health has substantiated nine cases
where timely medical care was denied to AIDS patients by providers) (citing Sullivan,
State Trying to Ease Fear in AIDS Care, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 27, 1985, at B, col. 4;
Discrimination, supra note 115, at 540, n. 11 (intern forcing young man with swollen
lymph nodes to leave hospital on cold and rainy night because of fear he had AIDS)
(citing Beaman, AIDS-Based Discrimination is Growing in the United States, L.A.
DAILY J., Jan. 21, 1985, Sec. 1, at 4, col. 3; Discrimination, supra note 116, at 540
n. 12 (refusal of fireman to perform mouth-to-mouth resuscitation on AIDS patients
and gay men and of ambulance drivers in several cities to transport AIDS patients
to the hospital) (citing Wallis, AIDS: A Growing Threat, TmE, Aug. 12, 1985, at

40, 45).

130. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 199.98(d) (West 1988).
131. Doe v. Roe, 139 Misc. 2d 209, 526 N.Y.S.2d 718, 721 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1988). See supra notes 116-119 and the accompanying text.
132. Schmerber v. California, 382 U.S. 757, 771 (1966).
133. Johnetta J. v. Municipal Court, 218 Cal. App. 3d 1255, 1284, 267 Cal.
Rptr. 666, 684 (1990).
134. Skinner v. Railway Labor Exec. Ass'n., 489 U.S. 602, 627 (1989); National
Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 672 (1989).
135. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (authority of a police officer to
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Finally, the reliance on a "clear relationship" between the goal
and the subject of the search that was demonstrated in the drug
testing cases is problematic here. It is less than clear what relationship
exists between the state's interest in .the health of its employees and
the testing of the subject. 3 6 This tenuous relationship may invoke the
sanction of Von Raab, which requires a "close and substantial
relationship" between the search and the goal of the government.'
In Von Raab, the testing of custom service employees for drug use
on the job was directly related to the government's interest in keeping
our borders secure, assuring that drug-impaired, armed Customs
Service agents were not posing a threat to public safety, and cutting
down on drug trafficking. 3 8 In Skinner, the testing of railroad operators for drug use was directly related to the government's interest in
9
reducing the number of drug and alcohol related rail accidents. 13 In
the AIDS setting however, it is unclear how testing the biter for AIDS
has any role in furthering the state interest in safeguarding the health
of the safety officer, because there is no indication that being bitten
by a carrier of the virus can result in transmission of the virus.140
The Court in Skinner also pointed out that the "toxicological
' 4
testing at issue might be viewed as significant in other contexts." ' '
Precisely what those "other contexts" might be is unclear, but the
serious potential effect on the subject of involuntary AIDS testing
may present just such a circumstance. Due to the lack of a "close
and substantial relationship' '1 42 between the government's interest and
forcing the biter to submit to testing and the serious effect of testing
on the subject, the fourth and final prong in the "minimal intrusion"
143 that
analysis fails. "[S]ome quantum of individualized suspicion"'
the biter is a carrier of the AIDS virus should be required under the
standards of Skinner and Von Raab.

stop and frisk those she reasonably suspects of committing a crime); Bell v. Wolfish,
441 U.S. 520 (1979) (need of prison officials to regulate safety in prisons allows body
cavity searches of prisoners).
136. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
137. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 676.
138. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 669-671
(1989).
139. Skinner v. Railway Labor Exec. Ass'n., 489 U.S. 602, 628 (1989).
140. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
141. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 628.
142. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 676.
143. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624 (quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428
U.S. 543, 560 (1976)).
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IS THE SPECIAL NEED A COMPELLING STATE INTEREST?

If the Court were to determine that the state's interest in AIDS
testing is a special need that may justify obviating the traditional
warrant and probable cause procedures, and that individualized suspicion is not required to test for AIDS in the Johnetta J. setting, the
analysis must be continued. In that hypothetical framework, the next
step in the analysis of the special needs doctrine is to measure the
elements of the state's asserted interest, as discussed above, to see if
they are indeed so compelling as to outweigh the individual privacy
interests implicated.
In both Skinner and Von Raab, the "special needs" were threats
to the safety of large numbers of people. In Skinner, the Court held
that the risk presented by the operation of a locomotive by one
impaired by drugs or alcohol so pressing to analogize it to the negligent
operation of nuclear power facility.'" The Court found "special
needs" in response to the empirically demonstrable and pre-existing
problem of drug-impaired employees operating trains. Similarly, the
Court in Von Raab felt that a threat to the alert operation of the
U.S. Customs Service in its drug interdiction mission to be of national
significance, despite the lack of evidence that a problem already
existed: "The Customs Service is our Nation's first line of defense
against one of the greatest problems affecting the health and welfare
of our population. We have adverted before to 'the veritable national
crisis in law enforcement caused by smuggling of illicit narcotics. ' " 45
In Johnetta J., however, no crisis or threat of similar scope or
seriousness are evident. The "special needs" involved include instead
the desire to allay the fear of the victim 46 as well as aiding in his or
her treatment. Though no compassionate human being would deny
these are serious concerns, they do not approach the national mag-

144. Skinner v. Railway Labor Exec. Ass'n., 489 U.S. 602, 628 (1989); See e.g.,
Rushton v. Nebraska Public Power, 844 F.2d 562, 566 (8th Cir. 1988) (conditioning
employment of technicians at nuclear power plant upon submission to urinalysis did
not violate the fourth amendment).
145. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 668 (1989)
(quoting United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 538 (1985)).
146. The court said, "Having all relevant information about potential exposure
to HIV also assists a patient in determining the extent to which that patient wishes
to make changes in his or her lifestyle to take into account the potential exposure,
such as changes in diet and exercise, as well as whether it is necessary to take
precautions in intimate relationships." Johnetta J. v. Municipal Ct., 218 Cal. App.
3d 1255, 1266, 267 Cal. Rptr. 666, 672 (quoting William Drew, M.D.).
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nitude of those found to be "compelling" state interests 47 in Skinner,
148
Von Raab, or other cases defining the "special needs" doctrine,
and may not qualify for inclusion among them. This is especially true
when one considers that no transmission of the AIDS virus by a bite
has ever been reported, and it is highly unlikely that one ever will
49
be. 1
Militating further against raising the level of the state's special
needs in mandatory AIDS testing to the level of a "compelling state
interest" 50 within the "special needs" doctrine is the tenuous assertion
that the testing will advance any state goal. As noted above, the
chances of the transmission of the AIDS virus by a bite are virtually
nonexistent,' and thus it is clear that there is little threat to public
safety officers of getting the AIDS virus from a bite. The fact that
the state may have an interest in the health of public safety officials
does not justify the use of means that have no rational relationship
to that goal. Unlike Skinner and the other cases construing the special
needs doctrine, 5 2 the "special needs" in Johnetta J. has no demonstrated relationship to an actual evil:
In Skinner, Bell, T.L.O. and Martinez-Fuerte, we took pains
to establish the existence of special need for the search or
seizure - a need based not upon the existence of a "pervasive
social problem" combined with speculation as to the effect of
that problem in the field at issue, but rather upon well known
or well demonstrated evils in that field, with well known or
well demonstrated consequences.' 53
Though Justice Scalia argued in his eloquent dissent in Von
Raab' 4 that there was no demonstrated evil present to justify the
147. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 628.

148. See O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987) (special needs of the government as employer); Griffin v. Wisconsin 483 U.S. 868 (1987) (interest of government
in searching of probationers' homes); New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987)
(searches of businesses engaged in activities subject to high levels of regulation); New
Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (citing the need of schools to maintain security
and order and environment conducive to learning); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520
(1979) (need of prison officials to regulate safety in prisons by cavity searches of
prisoners).
149. See supra note 64.
150. Skinner v. Railway Labor Exec. Ass'n., 489 U.S. 602, 628 (1989).
151. See supra note 64.
152. See supra note 44.

153. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 684 (1989)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
154. Id. at 680 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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testing of Customs Service employees, the majority's classification of
the potential harm as of a seriousness akin to an airline disaster was
thought to overcome any such shortfall in the relationship, since the
government may act reasonably to prevent such catastrophes.'5 5 Essentially, Von Raab described yet another analysis that may lead to a
finding of "special needs" based on a threatened harm of great
severity. However, with AIDS testing of the type allowed in Johnetta
J., not only is there no actual "evil" present in the form of public
safety officers getting AIDS from bites, but there is no actual threat
of harm. The scope of any problem small and narrowly defined and
its existence depends totally on the very speculation condemned by
Justice Scalia above. 1 6 The distinction from the Von Raab analysis is
clear. In Von Raab the threatened harm had yet to manifest itself in
a significant way, but some employees did indeed test positive for
drugs while on the job, 15 7 and the potential for other positive results
existed. With the Johnetta J. "special needs," however, it is empirically demonstrable that no transmission of AIDS through a bite has
occurred, and that virtually no such threat exists in the future.'58
Another relevant factor in the analysis of the intrusiveness of a
warrantless search is the lack of a less intrusive alternative. 5 9 Though
the Court in Skinner held that this element alone was not dispositive
of the reasonableness of a search,'6° implicit in the opinion was the
fact that such alternatives were simply not available because the degree
of impairment by drugs or alcohol sufficient to affect the employee's
performance of her duties was not necessarily observable to another.161
Despite a similar lack of easily observable manifestation of the virus
in the case of mandatory AIDS testing, the presence of a clearly less
intrusive and more effective alternative must be considered. Because
the results of such a test are not dispositive as to either the question
of whether the biter has AIDS or whether it was indeed transmitted, 6 2
the most effective way of knowing if the victim has been infected is
to test the victim, not his assaulter, both three months and six months
155. Id. at 674-75.
156. See supra note 64.

157. See supra note 58 and the accompanying text.
158. See supra note 64.

159. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 673-675
(1989).
160. Skinner v. Railway Labor Exec. Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 629, n. 9 (1989).
161. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 628.
162. Johnetta J. v. Municipal Court, 218 Cal. App. 3d 1255, 1269, 267 Cal.
Rptr. 666, 672 (1990); see infra notes 171-72.
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after the assault. 163 Not only is this much more effective in determining
the subject's AIDS status, but it is totally unintrusive upon the fourth
amendment rights of any other individual.
Though the court in Johnetta J. suggests that the test results
have medical utility as well, 164 this assertion is not borne out by logic.
The court suggests that a positive result in the test of the biter's blood
will assist the victim in deciding whether to begin treatments with
AZT, 65 which an expert at trial claimed that may prevent infection if
administered "a short period after the bite."' However, the treatments are both costly and laden with "severe side effects.' ' 67 This
may weigh heavily against treatment based on a positive result in the
biter's blood test alone, because the chances of transmission from her
are classified as "extremely low," "remote," "exceedingly low,"68
"clearly remote" and "highly remote" by the court in Johnetta J.'
Furthermore, the source of any evidence that early treatment
with AZT may prevent an AIDS infection from a bite is unfathomable,
since no such transmission has even been documented. 69 Faced with
the infinitesimally small chance of transmission and the highly unpleasant side effects and exorbitant cost of treatment with AZT, it is
unlikely that a person will chose to undergo the therapy based on the
result of the blood test of the biter, regardless of the result. What the
reasonable person will do if they fear transmission of the AIDS virus,
is have themselves tested, regardless of the test results of the biter.
By forcing the biter to undergo involuntary testing, nothing of
significance is added to the ability to treat the officer. Though the
court in Johnetta J. felt that a negative result of the biter's blood
would be useful to "allay the concerns of the patient, ' 1 70 this makes
little sense. If the officer is not comforted by the fact that there is
virtually no chance of getting AIDS through a bite, she is unlikely to
163. Johnetta J., 218 Cal. App. 3d at 1280-81, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 682.
164. Id. at 1267, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 673.
165. AZT is an experimental drug that has been shown to prolong the lives of
AIDS patients. 15 NURSE PRACT. 36, 39-44 (May 1990). It has been shown to delay
the onset of AIDS symptoms in persons with the virus. Testing, supra note 6, at 37,
103.
166. Johnetta J., 267 Cal. Rptr. at 673.
167. Id. By 1987, the cost of AZT treatments had grown to approximately
twenty-four dollars per day. CLOSEN, AIDS CASES AND MATERIALS 98 (1989) (quoting
CHICAGo TRIBUNE, March

29, 1987, at 10).

168. Johnetta J. v. Municipal Court, 218 Cal. App. 3d 1255, 1267, 267 Cal.

Rptr. 666, 673 (1990).
169. See supra note 64.
170. Johnetta J., 218 Cal. App. 3rd at 1266, 267 Cal.Rptr. at 672.
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be consoled because the biter tested negative, because such a result is
not dispositive of either the biter's AIDS status or whether the virus
was in fact transmitted. 7' Also, if the biter was infected with the
AIDS virus only recently, it may not show up in the test, despite the
fact that it is present and capable of being transmitted. 7 2 In fact,
mandatory AIDS testing may serve to unduly heighten the anxiety of
the bitten officer, since a positive result may give cause for worry
73
despite the slim chance of transmission.'
If indeed it is "prudent to err on the side of caution,"'1 74 as the
court suggests, then the reasonable course of action is for the victim
to exercise discretion in his lifestyle 175 for the short period until a test
of his own blood will provide the only dispositive answer to his fear
76
of contracting the AIDS virus.'
171. Id., 218 Cal. App. 3d at 1264, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 670. "A negative result
cannot absolutely rule out infection. The presence of false negatives may partly be a
characteristic of the test, or it may be the result of the latency period between
exposure to the virus and the development of the antibody." ConstitutionalImplications, supra note 7, at 228.

172. There is a window of time between infection with the AIDS virus and when
the body begins producing an antibody, which may be anywhere from six weeks to
eighteen months in lengh. During this time, the disease is undetectable, because the
blood test for AIDS actually tests for the antibodies and not for the virus itself.
Rape, supra note 31, at 1632 (quoting Hoffman, AIDS and Rape: Should New York
Test Sex Offenders?, VILAGE VOICE, Sept. 12, 1989, at 35). This window of time
seriously weakens the value of testing the assaulter, because he or she may only
recently have been infected so the test will not reveal the infection. Equally possible
is a positive test result attributable to the assaulter contracting the disease after the
attack but before the test. Id.
173. See supra note 64. The testing procedure frequently produces false positive
results. ConstitutionalImplications, supra note 7, at 226. False positives occur with
much greater frequency in tests of non-members of high risk groups, while false
negatives are more frequent in testing of high risk group members. Testing, supra
note 6, at 40-41.
174. Johnetta J., 218 Cal. App. 3d at 1267, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 672.
175. To practice discretion in one's lifestyle does not necessarily mean three to
six months of celibacy, but requires only a moderate degree of caution. Though
unprotected anal and vaginal intercourse are the most efficient means of transmitting
the virus, studies have shown that the proper use of condoms prevents the transmission
of the AIDS virus. See CLOSEN, AIDS CASES AND MATERIALS, 115 (1989) (unprotected
intercourse transmits virus) (Mager and DeGruttola, Human Immunodeficiency Virus
and Oral Intercourse, 107 ANN. INT. MED. 428 (1987); Conant, Condoms Prevent
the Transmission of AIDS-Associated Retrovirus, 225 J.A.M.A. 1706 (1986), quoted
in, CLOSEN, AIDS CASES AND MATERIALS 168 (1989) (condoms prevent transmission).

176. See Rape, supra note 31, at 1632 (1990) (The most effective way to protect
the interests of the assault victim is to "concentrate on testing, retesting, and
counseling of the victim) (quoting CRIm. JUST. NEWSL., April 17, 1989, at 3,
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It is apparent then, that the only efficacy of forcing the assaulter
to be tested for AIDS, without any reason to believe he is a carrier
of the virus, is in soothing the unreasonable fears of the bite victim,
for three months until a test of his or her own blood provides a much
better sample. The tense and understandably anxious three to six
month period of uncertainty is regrettable. However, classifying the
need for information of dubious efficacy gained by forced AIDS
testing as "special needs" in the class of protecting against airline
highjackings, or against the negligent operation of trains and nuclear
power plants is assuredly unwarranted. To hold that this qualifies as
a "compelling state interest" justifying a departure from the usual
warrant and probable cause requirements under the "special needs"
exception would substantially expand the meaning of the doctrine and
open the door to widespread abuse in an area already ripe for
discrimination .77
E. BALANCING OF THE COMPELLING STATE INTEREST AGAINST THE
INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY INTEREST.

The next element in the Supreme Court's analysis of the "special
needs" exception to the fourth amendment balances the level of
intrusiveness of the search upon the subject's interest in individual
1 78
liberty against the state's interest in conducting the search. In Von
Raab, the Court took notice of the fact that certain forms of public
employment may diminish privacy expectations with respect to personal searches: "Unlike private citizens or governmental employees in
should
general, employees involved in drug interdiction reasonably
79
probity."
and
fitness
their
expect effective inquiry into
Because the statute authorizing the AIDS tests in Johnetta J.
may only be invoked if the subject has been charged with interfering
(statement of Judge Mary C. Morgan)).
It has been suggested that if the victim of the bite was a pregnant woman, the
factors in the equation would be somewhat different since she must do more than
merely exercise discretion in her lifestyle: she must decide whether to carry the baby
to term knowing that there is a risk, however small, the infant will be born with the
AIDS virus. This argument begs the question however, since there is no difference
in the chances of transmission of AIDS from a bite whether the victim is male,
female, pregnant or not pregnant. The risk for the baby, as for its mother, remains
infinitesimally slight. See supra note 64 and the accompanying text.
177. See Doe v. Roe, 39 Misc. 2d 209, 26 N.Y.S.2d 718; see supra notes 115,
116, 128 and the accompanying text.
178. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 667-72.
179. Id.
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with the official duties of a public safety officer,180 the argument is
soundly made that an analogous reduction in privacy expectations has
occurred due to the biter's alleged undertaking of a criminal assault. 8 '
In fact a common thread that may be seen running through the case

law finding a reduced expectation of privacy with respect to AIDS

testing is the idea that the subjects have acted in some fashion or

function within some environment that results in a reduction of their

privacy interests.' 82 The environments which have served to reduce
privacy interests for purposes of AIDS testing include those heavily

regulated jobs discussed above,' 83 the military, 8 4 and a correctional

facility.'85 Actions a person may undertake that reduce his privacy
180. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 199.97 (West 1989).
181. Cf. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (the authority of a police officer to
stop and frisk someone who she reasonably suspects of committing a crime for
reasons of safety and investigatory efficiency); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979)
(need of prison officials to regulate safety in prisons by cavity searches of prisoners
override's inmates privacy interest).
182. See Leckelt v. Board of Comm'rs of Hosp. Dist. No. 1, 909 F.2d 820 (5th
Cir. 1990) (nurse in a hospital); Local 1812 Am. Fed'n of Gov't Emp. v. Department
of State, 662 F. Supp. 50 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (where employees of the Foreign Service
could be tested for AIDS based on their employment in a governmental agency that
closely regulates the health of its employees); New York v. Durham, 146 Misc. 2d
913, 553 N.Y.S.2d 944 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990) (where the subject had raped and
sodomized the victim and then announced he was an AIDS carrier); People v. Cook,
143 A.D.2d 486, 532 N.Y.S.2d 940 (App. Div. 1988) (constitutional rights of
defendant who pled guilty to rape not violated by mandatory AIDS test); People v.
Thomas, 139 Misc. 2d 1072, 529 N.Y.S.2d 429 ( N.Y. Co.Ct. 1988) (where the
subject raped and sodomized the victim); Mosele v. Bures 139 Misc. 2d 409, 528
N.Y.S.2d 976 (N.Y. Sup. 1988) (where the subject was a civil plaintiff claiming
malpractice for exposure to the AIDS virus); Haywood County v. Hudson 740
S.W.2d 718 (Tenn. 1987) (where the subject, a murder suspect in custody of the
county sheriff, announced to the authorities that he suffered from AIDS.); Dunn v.
White, 880 F.2d 1189 (10th Cir. 1989) (where the subject's limited privacy rights as
a federal prisoner were outweighed by the prison's interest in treating inmates with
AIDS and preventing further spread of the disease).
183. See supra notes 19-22, 44, 78 and the accompanying text.
184. Army Reg. 600-110, Identification, Surveillance, and Administration of
PersonnelInfected with Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV)(March 11, 1988). See

generally Doe v. Garrett, 903 F.2d 1455 (11th Cir. 1990) (positive AIDS test prevented
petitioner from returning to active duty in navy); Plowman v. United States, 698 F.
Supp. 627 (E.D.Va. 1988) (possibility of transmission of AIDS virus during emergency
surgery in army hospital justified testing without patient's consent); Aviles v. United
States, 696 F. Supp. 217 (E.D.La. 1988) (Coast Guard policy of testing service
members for AIDS and putting those who test positive on retirement from active
duty); see supra note 12.
185. Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1189 (10th Cir. 1988) (subject's limited privacy
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expectation include rape, 86 voluntary disclosure to a correctional
88
official,' 87 applying for temporary resident status as an alien, and
on the plaintiff's AIDS
bringing of a civil suit in which 1information
89
damages.
of
status is an element
Of the actions found to reduce one's expectations of privacy for

purposes of AIDS testing, the most analogous to biting another would
be rape, because it also involves the exchange of bodily fluids.

However, the rationale for the reduction in privacy in the case of a
rape is much stronger than in the case of a bite, since the bodily
fluids exchanged in rape are much more likely to result in the
9°
transmission of AIDS than is a bite of any kind.' Furthermore, the
physical trauma associated with rape may result in heightened vulner9
ability to transmission of the virus through broken tissue.' ' Given
rights as a federal prisoner were outweighed by the prison's interest in treating
inmates with AIDS); Harris v. Thigpen, 727 F.Supp. 1564 (M.D. Ala. 1990) (AIDS
testing of prisoners). But see Glover v. Eastern Neb. Community Office of Retardation, 867 F.2d 461, 463 (8th Cir. 1989) (employees' jobs with state agency dealing
with the mentally retarded. in setting with frequent incidents of biting and scratching
did not justify mandatory AIDS testing of the employees because the risk of
transmission of the virus by these methods is "near zero"); Thomas v. Atascadero
Unified School Dist., 662 F.Supp 376 (C.D.Cal. 1987) (kindergarten class, where
biting incidents involving an AIDS-infected child had occurred previously, was not
an environment that allowed for exclusion of the AIDS-infected child because of the
low possibility of transmission of AIDS by a bite).
186. People v. Thomas, 139 Misc. 2d 1072, 529 N.Y.S.2d 429 (N.Y. Co.Ct.
1988) (where the subject of mandatory test raped and sodomized the victim); see also
New York v Durham, 146 Misc. 2d 913, 553 N.Y.S.2d 944 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990)
(subject had raped and sodomized the victim and then announced he was an AIDS
carrier). For a discussion of mandatory AIDS testing of sex offenders, see Rape,
supra note 31.

187. Haywood County v. Hudson, 740 S.W.2d 718 (Tenn. 1987).
188. 8 C.F.R. § 245(a.4)9ii (1990) requires "[aill applicants who file for temporary resident status are required to include the results of a serological test for the
HIV virus on the 1-693" (this refers to Form 1-693, Medical Examination of Aliens
Seeking Adjustment of Status, (Pub.L. 1-693) (note by the author)). See also 52 Fed.
Reg. 32,540 (1987).
189. Mosele v. Bures, 139 Misc. 2d 409, 528 N.Y.S.2d 976 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988)
(where the subject was a civil plaintiff claiming, inter alia, malpractice for exposure
to the AIDS virus).
190. See, Glover v. Eastern Neb. Com. Office of Retardation, 867 F.2d 461,
463 (1989) (chance of transmission of the AIDS virus by a bite is "extraordinarily
low, also approaching zero."); Thomas, 662 F. Supp. at 380 ("The overwhelming
weight of medical evidence is that the AIDS virus is not transmitted by human bites,
even bites that break the skin." However, "transmission by either semen or blood
accounts for virtually all reported cases.").
191. Rape, supra note 31, at 1630 ("strong possibility of HIV transmission in a
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this, it is questionable whether biting is an act which may justify
removing an individual's right to refuse AIDS testing. If the condition
tested for was indeed one transmittable by a bite, the rationale would
better apply. However, because AIDS does not appear to be such a
condition, biting may not be an action which justifies the state's
overriding of the privacy rights of the individual.
IV.

CONCLUSION

If the United States Supreme Court were to rule on the precise
issue presented to the Johnetta J. court, the "special needs" analysis
of Skinner et al. would be a poor fit. Because the problem of police
officers getting AIDS from being bitten is not currently a reality and
is not likely to be one to any significant degree in the future, the two
current applicable analyses would fail to include the Johnetta J. fact
pattern within the "special needs" doctrine. To include it would
require the adoption of an additional and more liberal "special needs"
analysis that finds such in the absence of both a demonstrable evil
and the threat of potential and substantial harm, requiring only that
the feared occurrence is likely enough that it cannot be completely
ruled out.' 92 This would serve to significantly expand the doctrine,
and impose upon constitutionally guaranteed rights in the name of a
dubious manner of pursuing the state's interest in the health of public
safety officers. Though this interest sounds benevolent enough, extreme care is called for when constitutional rights are implicated in
the name of exigency:
Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect
liberty when the Government's purposes are beneficent. Men
born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their
liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty
lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning
but without understanding. 91
The encroachment here recalls Justice Holmes caveat with such
accuracy as to render it nearly prophetic. There can be no doubt of
the beneficent intent behind Proposition 96, however it appears with
sexual assault") (quoting Report of the Presidential Commission on the Human
Immunodeficiency Virus Epidemic (June 1988)).
192. Johnetta J. v. Municipal Court, 218 Cal. App. 3d 1260, 1269-70, 267 Cal.
Rptr. 666, 674 (1990).
193. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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9
equal clarity that these "men of zeal" 94 are "without understanding"'
of the real risks involved in the transmission of the AIDS virus. The
court in Johnetta J. recognized this to some extent, but declined to
9
overturn the statute on separation of powers grounds,' 6 stating that
1 97
However,
"it is not for courts to judge the wisdom of legislation.'
is to
court
the
of
role
the
implicated,
is
right
where a constitutional
98
state's
the
that
assure
to
and
serve as a check on the legislature'
asserted interest warrants the intrusion. As shown above, the state's
asserted interest is served only marginally, if at all, by mandatory
AIDS testing in this setting, and may in fact be disserved, because of
the undue anxiety a positive result could produce. In light of the
above analysis, mandatory AIDS testing absent probable cause of
transmission of the virus does not fall within a recognized exception
to the fourth amendment, and should not be allowed as a matter of
law.

PAUL T. WHITCOMBE

194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

Id.
Id.
Johnetta J., 218 Cal. App. 3d at 1300, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 685.
Id.
See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 13.7 (1803).

